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Abstract
We study secure and privacy-preserving data analysis based on queries executed on samples
from a dataset. Trusted execution environments (TEEs) can be used to protect the content
of the data during query computation, while supporting differential-private (DP) queries in
TEEs provides record privacy when query output is revealed. Support for sample-based queries
is attractive due to privacy amplification since not all dataset is used to answer a query but
only a small subset. However, extracting data samples with TEEs while proving strong DP
guarantees is not trivial as secrecy of sample indices has to be preserved. To this end, we design
efficient secure variants of common sampling algorithms. Experimentally we show that accuracy
of models trained with shuffling and sampling is the same for differentially private models for
MNIST and CIFAR-10, while sampling provides stronger privacy guarantees than shuffling.
1 Introduction
Sensitive and proprietary datasets (e.g., health, personal and financial records, laboratory experi-
ments, emails, and other personal digital communication) often come with strong privacy and access
control requirements and regulations that are hard to maintain and guarantee end-to-end. The fears
of data leakage may block datasets from being used by data scientists and prevent collaboration
and information sharing between multiple parties towards a common good (e.g., training a disease
detection model across data from multiple hospitals). For example, the authors of [11, 14, 35] show
that machine learning models can memorize individual data records, while information not required
for the agreed upon learning task may be leaked in collaborative learning [25]. To this end, we are
interested in designing the following secure data query framework:
• A single or multiple data owners contribute their datasets to the platform while expecting
strong security privacy guarantees on the usage of their data;
• The framework acts as a gatekeeper of the data and a computing resource of the data scientist:
it can compute queries on her behalf while ensuring that data is protected from third parties;
• Data scientist queries the data via the framework via a range of queries varying from
approximating sample statistics to training complex machine learning models.
The goal of the framework is to allow data scientist to query the data while providing strong privacy
guarantees to data owners on their data. The framework aims to protect against two classes of
attackers: the owner of the computing infrastructure of the framework and the data scientist.
The data scientist may try to infer more information about the dataset than what is available
through a (restricted) class of queries supported by the framework. We consider the following
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two collusion scenarios. As the framework may be hosted in the cloud or on premise of the data
scientist’s organization, the infrastructure is not trusted as one can access the data without using
the query interface. The second collusion may occur in a multi-data-owner scenario where the data
scientist could combine the answer of a query and data of one of the parties to infer information
about other parties’ data. Hence, the attacker may have auxiliary information about the data.
In the view of the above requirements and threat model we propose Private Sampling-based
Query Framework. It relies on secure hardware to protect data content and restrict data access.
Additionally, it supports sample-based differentially private queries for efficiency and privacy.
However, naive combination of these components does not lead to an end-to-end secure system for
the following reason. Differential privacy guarantees for sampling algorithms (including machine
learning model training that build on them [3, 23, 43]) are satisfied only if the sample is hidden.
Unfortunately as we will see this is not the case with secure hardware due to leakage of memory
access patterns. To this end, we design novel algorithms for producing data samples using two
common sampling techniques, Sampling without replacement and Poisson, with the guarantee that
whoever observes data access patterns cannot identify the indices of the dataset used in the samples.
We also argue that if privacy of data during model training is a requirement then sampling should
be used instead of the default use of shuffling since it incurs smaller privacy loss in return to similar
accuracy as we show experimentally. We now describe components of our Private Sampling-based
Query Framework.
Framework security In order to protect data content and computation from the framework
host, we rely on encryption and trusted execution environments (TEE). TEEs can be enabled
using secure hardware capabilities such as Intel SGX [19] which provides a set of CPU instructions
that gives access to special memory regions (enclaves) where encrypted data is loaded, decrypted
and computed on. Importantly access to this region is restricted and data is always encrypted in
memory. One can also verify the code and data that is loaded in TEEs via attestation. Hence,
data owners can provide data encrypted under the secret keys that are available only to TEEs
running specific code (e.g., differentially private algorithms). Some of the limitations of TEEs
include resource sharing with the rest of the system (e.g., caches, memory, network), which may
lead to side-channels [10, 18, 30]. Another limitation of existing TEEs is the amount of available
enclave memory (e.g., Intel Skylake CPUs restrict the enclave page cache to 128MB). Though one
can use system memory, the resulting memory paging does not only produce performance overhead
but also introduces more memory side-channels [42].
Sample-based data analysis Data sampling has many applications in data analysis from
returning an approximate query result to training a model using mini-batch stochastic gradient
descent (SGD). Sampling can be used for approximating results when performing the computation
on the whole dataset is expensive (e.g., graph analysis or frequent itemsets [32, 33]) ∗ or not needed
(e.g., audit of a financial institution by a regulator based on a sample of the records). We consider
various uses of sampling, including queries that require a single sample, multiple samples such as
bootstrapping statistics, or large number of samples such as training of a neural network.
Sampling-based queries provide: Efficiency: computing on a sample is faster than on the whole
dataset, which fits the TEE setting, and can be extended to process dataset samples in parallel
with multiple TEEs. Expressiveness: a large class of queries can be answered approximately using
samples, furthermore sampling (or mini-batching) is at the core of training modern machine learning
∗We note that we use sampling differently from statistical approaches that treat the dataset D as a sample from a
population and use all records in D to estimate parameters of the underlying population.
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models. Privacy: a query result from a sample reveals information only about the sample and not
the whole dataset. Though intuitively privacy may come with sampling, it is not always true. If
a data scientist knows indices of the records in the sample used for a query, then given the query
result they learn more about records in that sample than about other records. However if sample
indices are hidden then there is plausible deniability. Luckily, differential privacy takes advantage of
privacy from sampling and formally captures it with privacy amplification [8, 20, 22].
Differential privacy Differential privacy (DP) is a rigorous definition of individual privacy when
a result of a query on the dataset is revealed. Informally, it states that a single record does not
significantly change the result of the query. Strong privacy can be guaranteed in return for a drop
in accuracy for simple statistical queries [13] and complex machine learning models [3, 7, 23, 41, 43].
DP mechanisms come with a parameter , where higher  signifies a higher privacy loss.
Amplification by sampling is a well known result in differential privacy. Informally, it says that
when an -DP mechanism is applied on a sample of size γn from a dataset D of size n, γ < 1, then
the overall mechanism is O(γ)-DP w.r.t. D. Small  parameters reported from training of neural
networks using DP SGD [3, 23, 43] make extensive use of privacy amplification in their analysis.
Importantly, for this to hold they all require the sample identity to be hidden.
DP algorithms mentioned above are set in the trusted curator model where hiding the sample
is not a problem as algorithm execution is not visible to an attacker (i.e., the data scientist who
obtains the result in our setting). TEEs can be used only as an approximation of this model due to
the limitations listed above: revealing memory access patterns of a differentially-private algorithm
can be enough to violate or weaken its privacy guarantees. Sampling-based DP algorithms fall
in the second category as they make an explicit assumption that the identity of the sample is
hidden [40, 45]. If not, amplification based results cannot be applied. If one desires the same level
of privacy, higher level of noise will need to be added which would in turn reduce the utility of the
results.
Differential privacy is attractive since it can keep track of the privacy loss over multiple queries.
Hence, reducing privacy loss of individual queries and supporting more queries as a result, is an
important requirement. Sacrificing on privacy amplification by revealing sample identity is wasteful.
Data-oblivious sampling algorithms Query computation can be supported in a TEE since
samples are small compared to the dataset and can fit into private memory of a TEE. However,
naive implementation of data sampling algorithms is inefficient (due to random access to memory
outside of TEE) and insecure in our threat model (since sample indices are trivially revealed).
Naively hiding sample identity would be to read a whole dataset and only keep elements whose
indices happen to be in the sample. This would require reading the entire dataset for each sample
(training of models usually requires small samples, e.g., 0.01% of the dataset). This will also not be
competitive in performance with shuffling-based approaches used today.
To this end, we propose novel algorithms for producing data samples for two popular sampling
approaches: sampling without replacement and Poisson. Samples produced by shuffling-based
sampling contain distinct elements, however elements may repeat between the samples. Our
algorithms are called data-oblivious [15] since the memory accesses they produce are independent of
the sampled indices. Our algorithms are efficient as they require only two data oblivious shuffles
and one scan to produce n/m samples of size m that is sufficient for one epoch of training. An
oblivious sampling algorithm would be used as follows: n/m samples are generated at once, stored
individually encrypted, and then loaded in a TEE on a per-query request.
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Contributions (i) We propose a Private Sampling-based Query Framework for querying sensitive
data; (ii) We use differential privacy to show that sampling algorithms are an important building
block in privacy-preserving frameworks; (iii) We develop efficient and secure (data-oblivious)
algorithms for two common sampling techniques; (iv) We empirically show that for MNIST and
CIFAR-10 using sampling algorithms for generating mini-batches during differentially-private training
achieves the same accuracy as shuffling, even though sampling incurs smaller privacy loss than
shuffling.
2 Notation and Background
A dataset D contains n elements; each element e has a key and a value; keys are distinct in [1, n]. If
a dataset does not have keys, we use its element index in the array representation of D as a key.
Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) provides strong protection guarantees to data in its
private memory: it is not visible to an adversary who can control everything outside of the CPU, e.g.,
even if it controls the operating system (OS) or the VM. The private memory of TEEs (depending
on the side-channel threat model) is restricted to CPU registers (few kilobytes) or caches (32MB) or
enclave page cache (128MB). Since these sizes will be significantly smaller than usual datasets, an
algorithm is required to store the data in the external memory. Since external memory is controlled
by an adversary (e.g., an OS), it can observe its content and the memory addresses requested from
a TEE. Probabilistic encryption can be used to protect the content of data in external memory:
an adversary seeing two ciphertexts cannot tell if they are encryptions of the same element or a
dummy of the same size as a real element.
Though the size of primary memory is not sufficient to process a dataset, it can be leveraged
for sample-based data analysis queries as follows. When a query requires a sample, it loads an
encrypted sample from the external memory into the TEE, decrypts it, performs a computation
(for example, SGD), discards the sample, and either updates a local state (for example, parameters
of the ML model maintained in a TEE) and proceeds to the next sample, or encrypts the result of
the computation under data scientist’s secret key and returns it.
Addresses (or memory access sequence) requested by a TEE can leak information about data.
Leaked information depends on adversary’s background knowledge (attacks based on memory accesses
have been shown for image and text processing [42]). In general, many (non-differentially-private
and differentially-private [4]) algorithms leak their access pattern including sampling (see §4.1).
Data-oblivious algorithms access memory in a manner that appears to be independent
of the sensitive data. For example, sorting networks are data-oblivious as compare-and-swap
operators access the same array indices independent of the array content, in contrast to quick sort.
Data-oblivious algorithms have been designed for array access [15, 16, 37], sorting [17], machine
learning algorithms [29] and several data structures [39]; while this work is the first to consider
sampling algorithms. The performance goal of oblivious algorithms is to reduce the number of
additional accesses to external memory needed to hide real accesses.
Our sampling algorithms in §4 rely on an oblivious shuffle oblshuffle(D) [28]. A shuffle rearranges
elements according to permutation pi s.t. element at index i is placed at location pi[i] after the
shuffle. An oblivious shuffle does the same except the adversary observing its memory accesses does
not learn pi. The Melbourne shuffle [28] makes O(cn) accesses to external memory with private
memory of size O( c
√
n). This overhead is constant since non-oblivious shuffle need to make n accesses.
Oblivious shuffle can use smaller private memory at the expense of more accesses (see [31]). It
is important to note that while loading data into private memory, the algorithm re-encrypts the
elements to avoid trivial comparison of elements before and after the shuffle.
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Differential privacy A randomized mechanism M : D → R is (, δ) differentially private [13]
if for any two neighbouring datasets D0,D1 ∈ D and for any subset of outputs R ∈ R it holds
that Pr[M(D0) ∈ R] ≤ e Pr[M(D1) ∈ R] + δ. We use substitute-one neighbouring relationship
where |D0| = |D1| and D0,D1 are different in one element. This relationship is natural for sampling
without replacement and data-oblivious setting where an adversary knows |D|. As we see in §4.2
hiding the size of Poisson sampling in our setting is non-trivial and we choose to hide the number of
samples instead.
Gaussian mechanism [13] is a common way of obtaining differentially private variant of real
valued function f : D → R. Let ∆f be the L2-sensitivity of f , that is the maximum distance
‖f(D0)− f(D1)‖2 between any D0 and D1. Then, Gaussian noise mechanism is defined byM(D) =
f(D) +N (0, σ2) where N (0, σ2∆2f ) is a Gaussian distribution with mean 0 and standard deviation
σ∆f . The resulting mechanism is (, δ)-DP if σ =
√
2 log(1.25/δ)/ for , δ ∈ (0, 1).
Sampling methods Algorithms that operate on data samples often require more than one
sample. For example, machine learning model training proceeds in epochs where each epoch processes
multiple batches (or samples) of data. The number of samples k and sample size m are usually
chosen such that n ≈ km so that every data element has a non-zero probability of being processed
during an epoch. To this end, we define samplesA(D, q, k) that produces samples s1, s2, . . . , sk using
a sampling algorithm A and parameter q, where si is a set of keys from [1, n]. For simplicity we
assume that m divides n and k = n/m. We omit stating the randomness used in samplesA but
assume that every call uses a new seed. We will now describe three sampling methods that vary
based on element distribution within each sample and between the samples.
Sampling without replacement (SWO) produces a sample by drawing m distinct elements
uniformly at random from a set [1, n], hence probability of a sample s is 1n
1
n−1 · · · 1n−m+1 . Let
Fn,mSWO be the set of all SWO samples of size m from domain [1, n]; samplesSWO(D,m, k) draws k
samples from Fn,mSWO with replacement: elements cannot repeat within the same sample but can
repeat between the samples. Poisson Sampling (Poisson) s is constructed by independently adding
each element from [1, n] with probability γ, that is Pr(j ∈ s) = γ. Hence, probability of a sample
s is Prγ(s) = γ
|s|(1 − γ)n−|s|. Let Fn,γPoisson be the set of all Poisson samples from domain [1, n].
Then, samplesPoisson(D, γ, k) draws k elements with replacement from Fn,γPoisson. The size of a Poisson
sample is a random variable and γn on average. Sampling via Shuffle is common for obtaining
mini-batches for SGD in practice. It shuffles D and splits it in batches of size m. If more than k
samples are required, the procedure is repeated. Similar to SWO or Poisson, each sample contains
distinct elements, however in contrast to them, a sequence of k samples contain distinct elements
between the samples.
3 Privacy via Sampling and Differential privacy
Privacy amplification of differential privacy captures the relationship of performing analysis over
a sample vs. whole dataset. Let M be a randomized mechanism that is (, δ)-DP and let sample
be a random sample from dataset D of size γn, where γ < 1 is a sampling parameter. Let
M′ = M ◦ sample be a mechanism that applies M on a sample of D. Then, informally, M′ is
(O(γ), γδ)-DP [8, 22].
Sampling For Poisson and sampling without replacement ′ of M′ is log(1 + γ(e − 1)) [22] and
log(1 +m/n(e − 1)) [6], respectively. We refer the reader to Balle et al. [6] who provide a unified
framework for studying amplification of these sampling mechanisms. Crucially all amplification
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Table 1: Parameters (′, δ′) of mechanisms that use (, δ)-DP mechanism M with one of the three
sampling techniques with a sample of size m from a dataset of size n and γ = m/n for Poisson
sampling, where ′ < 1, δ′′ > 0, T is the number of samples in an epoch, E is the number of epochs.
Sampling mechanism
# analyzed samples of size m
T ≤ n/m T = En/m, E ≥ 1
Shuffling , δ O(
√
E log(1/δ′′)), Eδ + δ′′)
Poisson, SWO O(γ
√
T log(1/δ′′)), Tγδ + δ′′)
Poisson & Gaussian distribution [3] O(γ
√
T ), δ
results assume that the sample is hidden during the analysis as otherwise amplification results cannot
hold. That is, if the keys of the elements of a sample are revealed, M′ has the same (, δ) as M.
Privacy loss of executing a sequence of DP mechanisms can be analyzed using several approaches.
Strong composition theorem [13] states that running T (, δ)-mechanisms would be (
√
2T log(1/δ′′)+
T(e − 1), T δ + δ′′)-DP, δ′′ ≥ 0. Better bounds can be obtained if one takes advantage of the
underlying DP mechanism. Abadi et al. [3] introduce the moments accountant that leverages the
fact that M′ uses Poisson sampling and applies Gaussian noise to the output. They obtain ′ =
O(γ
√
T ), δ′ = δ.
Shuffling Analysis of differential private parameters ofM′ that operates on samples obtained from
shuffling is different. Parallel composition by McSherry [24] can be seen as the privacy “amplification”
result for shuffling. It states that running T algorithms in parallel on disjoint samples of the dataset
has ′ = maxi∈[1,T ] i where i is the parameter of the ith mechanism. It is a significantly better
result than what one would expect from using DP composition theorem, since it relies on the
fact that samples are disjoint. If one requires multiple passes over a dataset (as is the case with
multi-epoch training), strong composition theorem can be used with parallel composition.
Sampling vs. Shuffling DP Guarantees We bring the above results together in Table 1 to
compare the parameters of several sampling approaches. As we can see, sampling based approaches for
general DP mechanisms give an order of O(
√
m/n) smaller epsilon than shuffling based approaches.
It is important to note that sampling-based approaches assume that the indices (or keys) of the
dataset elements used by the mechanism remain secret. In §4 we develop algorithms with this
property.
Differentially private SGD We now turn our attention to a differentially private mechanism
for mini-batch stochastic gradient descent computation. The mechanism is called NoisySGD [7, 36]
and when applied instead of non-private mini-batch SGD allows for a release of a machine learning
model with differential privacy guarantees on the training data. For example, it has been applied in
Bayesian learning [41] and to train deep learning [3, 23, 43] and logistic regression [36] models.
It proceeds as follows. Given a mini-batch (or sample) the gradient of every element in a batch is
computed and the L2 norm of the gradient is clipped according to a clipping parameter C. Then a
noise is added to the sum of the (clipped) gradients of all the elements and the result is averaged over
the sample size. The noise added to the result is from Gaussian distribution parametrized with C
and a noise scale parameter σ: N (0, σ2C2). The noise is proportional to the sensitivity of the sum
of gradients to the value of each element in the sample. The amount of privacy budget that a single
batch processing, also called subsampled Gaussian mechanism, incurs depends on the parameters of
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the noise distribution and how the batch is sampled. The model parameters are iteratively updated
after every NoisySGD processing. The number of iterations and the composition mechanism used
to keep track of the privacy loss determine the DP parameters of the overall training process.
Abadi et al. [3] report analytical results assuming Poisson sampling but use shuffling to obtain the
samples in the evaluation. Yu et al. [43] point out the discrepancy between analysis and experimental
results in [3], that is, the reported privacy loss is underestimated due to the use of shuffling. Yu et
al. proceed to analyze shuffling and sampling but also use shuffling in their experiments. Hence,
though analytically Poisson and SWO sampling provide better privacy parameters than shuffling,
there is no evidence that the accuracy is the same between the approaches in practice. We fill in
this gap in §5 and show that for the benchmarks we have tried it is indeed the case.
4 Oblivious Sampling Algorithms
In this section, we develop data-oblivious algorithms for generating a sequence of samples from
a dataset D such that the total number of samples is sufficient for a single epoch of a training
algorithm. Moreover, our algorithms will access the original dataset at indices that appear to be
independent of how elements are distributed across the samples. As a result, anyone observing their
memory accesses cannot identify, how many and which samples each element of D appears in.
4.1 Oblivious sampling without replacement (SWO)
We introduce a definition of an oblivious sampling algorithm: oblivious samplesSWO(D,m) is a
randomized algorithm that returns k = n/m SWO samples from D and produces memory accesses
that are indistinguishable between invocations for all datasets of size n = |D| and generated samples.
As a warm-up, consider the following naive way of generating a single SWO sample of size m
from dataset D stored in external memory of a TEE: generate m distinct random keys from [1, n]
and load from external memory elements of D that are stored at those indices. This trivially reveals
the sample to an observer of memory accesses. A secure but inefficient way would be to load D[l]
for ∀l ∈ [1, n] and, if l matches one of the m random keys, keep D[l] in private memory. This incurs
n accesses to generate a sample of size m. Though our algorithm will also make a linear number of
accesses to D, it will amortize this cost by producing n/m samples.
The high level description of our secure and efficient algorithm for producing k samples is as
follows. Choose k samples from Fn,mSWO, numbering each sample with an identifier 1 to k; the keys
within the samples (up to a mapping) will represent the keys of elements used in the samples of
the output. Then, while scanning D, replicate elements depending on how many samples they
should appear in and associate each replica with its sample id. Finally, group elements according to
sample ids.
Preliminaries Our algorithm relies on a primitive that can efficiently draw k samples from Fn,mSWO
(denoted via SWO.initialize(n,m)). It also provides a function SWO.samplemember(i, j) that returns
True if key j is in the ith sample and False otherwise. This primitive can be instantiated using k
pseudo-random permutations ρi over [1, n]. Then sample i is defined by the first m indices of the
permutation, i.e., element with key j is in the sample i if ρi(j) ≤ m. This procedure is described in
more detail in Appendix §A.
We will use rj to denote the number of samples where key j appears in, that is rj =
|{i | samplemember(i, j), ∀i ∈ [1, k], ∀j ∈ [1, n]}|. It is important to note that samples drawn
above are used as a template for a valid SWO sampling (i.e., to preserve replication of elements
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across the samples). However, the final samples s1, s2, . . . , sk returned by the algorithm will be
instantiated with keys that are determined using function pi′ (which will be defined later). In
particular, for all samples, if samplemember(i, j) is true then pi′(j) ∈ si.
Description The pseudo-code in Algorithm 1 provides the details of the method. It starts with
dataset D obliviously shuffled according to a random secret permutation pi (Line 1). Hence, element e
is stored (re-encrypted) in D at index pi(e.key). The next phase replicates elements such that for
every index j ∈ [1, n] there is an element (not necessarily with key j) that is replicated rj times
(Lines 4-14). The algorithm maintains a counter l which keeps the current index of the scan in the
array and enext which stores the element read from lth index.
Algorithm 1 Oblivious samplesSWO(D,m):
takes an encrypted dataset D and returns
k = n/m SWO samples of size m, n = |D|.
1: D ← oblshuffle(D)
2: SWO.initialize(n,m)
3: S ← [], j ← 1, l ← 1, e ← D[1], enext ←
D[1]
4: while l ≤ n do
5: for i ∈ [1, k] do
6: if SWO.samplemember(i, j) then
7: S.append(re-enc(e), enc(i))
8: l← l + 1
9: enext ← D[l]
10: end if
11: end for
12: e← enext
13: j ← j + 1
14: end while
15: S ← oblshuffle(S)
16: ∀i ∈ [1, k] : si ← []
17: for p ∈ S do
18: (ce, ci)← p, i← dec(ci)
19: si ← si.append(ce)
20: end for
21: Return s1, s2, . . . , sk
Additionally the algorithm maintains ele-
ment e which is an element that currently is
being replicated. It is updated to enext as soon
as sufficient number of replicas is reached. The
number of times e is replicated depends on the
number of samples element with key j appears
in. Counter j starts at 1 and is incremented af-
ter element e is replicated rj times. At any given
time, counter j is an indicator of the number
of distinct elements written out so far. Hence,
j can reach n only if every element appears in
exactly one sample. On the other hand, the
smallest j can be is m, this happens when all k
samples are identical.
Given the above state, the algorithm reads
an element into enext, loops internally through
i ∈ [1..k]: if current key j is in ith sample it
writes out an encrypted tuple (e, i) and reads
the next element from D into enext. Note that
e is re-encrypted every time it is written out in
order to hide which one of the elements read
so far is being written out. After the scan, the
tuples are obliviously shuffled. At this point,
the sample id i of each tuple is decrypted and
used to (non-obliviously) group elements that
belong to the same sample together, creating
the sample output s1..sk (Lines 16-20).
We are left to derive the mapping m between
keys used in samples drawn in Line 2 and elements returned in samples s1..sk. We note that m
is not explicitly used during the algorithm and is used only in the analysis. From the algorithm
we see that m(l) = pi−1(1 +
∑l−1
j=1 rj), that is m is derived from pi with shifts due to replications
of preceding keys. (Observe that if every element appears only in one sample m(l) = pi−1(l).) We
show that m is injective and random (Lemma 1) and, hence, s1..sk are valid SWO samples.
Example Let D = {(1, A), (2, B), (3, C), (4, D), (5, E), (6, F )}, where (4, D) denotes element D
at index 4 (used also as a key), m = 2, and randomly drawn samples in SWO.initialize are {1, 4},
{1, 2}, {1, 5}. Suppose D after the shuffle is {(4, D), (1, A), (5, E), (3, C), (6, F ), (2, B)}. Then,
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after the replication S = {((4, D), 1), ((4, D), 2), ((4, D), 3), ((3, C), 2), ((6, F ), 1), ((2, B), 3)} where
the first tuple ((4, D), 1) indicates that (4, D) appears in the first sample.
Correctness We show that samples returned by the algorithm correspond to samples drawn
randomly from Fm,nSWO. We argue that samples returned by the oblivious samplesSWO are identical to
those drawn truly at random from Fm,nSWO up to key mapping m and then show that m is injective
and random in Appendix A. For every key j present in the drawn samples there is an element with
key m(j) that is replicated rj times and is associated with the sample ids of j. Hence, returned
samples, after being grouped, are exactly the drawn samples where every key j is substituted with
an element with key m(j).
Security and performance The adversary observes an oblivious shuffle, a scan where an element
is read and an encrypted pair is written, another oblivious shuffle and then a scan that reveals the
sample identifiers. All patterns except for revealing of the sample identifiers are independent of the
data and sampled keys. We argue security further in §A. Performance of oblivious SWO sampling is
dominated by two oblivious shuffles and the non-oblivious grouping, replication scan has linear cost.
Hence, our algorithm produces k samples in time O(cn) with private memory of size O( c
√
n). Since
a non-oblivious version would require n accesses, our algorithm has a constant overhead for small c.
Observations We note that if more than k samples of size m = n/k need to be produced, one
can invoke the algorithm multiple times using different randomness. Furthermore, Algorithm 1 can
produce samples of varying sizes m1,m2, ..,mk (n =
∑
mi) given as an input. The algorithm itself
will remain the same. However, in order to determine if j is in sample i or not, samplemember(i, j)
will check if ρi(j) ≤ mi instead of ρi(j) ≤ m.
4.2 Oblivious Poisson sampling
Performing Poisson sampling obliviously requires not only hiding access pattern but also the size
of the samples. Since in the worst case the sample can be of size n, each sample will need to be
padded to n with dummy elements. Unfortunately generating k samples each padded to size n is
impractical. Though samples of size n are unlikely, revealing some upper bound on sample size
would affect the security of the algorithms relying on Poisson sampling.
Instead of padding to the worst case, we choose to hide the number of samples that are contained
within an n-sized block of data (e.g., an epoch). In particular, our oblivious Poisson sampling
returns S that consists of samples s1, s2, . . . , sk′ where k
′ ≤ k such that ∑i∈[1,k′] |si| ≤ n. The
security of sampling relies on hiding k′ and the boundary between the samples, as otherwise an
adversary can estimate sample sizes.
The algorithm, presented in Algorithm 2, proceeds similar to SWO except every element, in
addition to being associated with a sample id, also stores its position in final S. The element and
the sample id are kept private while the position is used to order the elements. It is then up to
the queries that operate on the samples inside of a TEE (e.g., SGD computation) to use sample id
while scanning S to determine the sample boundaries. The use of samplesPoisson by the queries has
to be done carefully without revealing when the sample is actually used as this would reveal the
boundary (e.g., while reading the elements during an epoch, one needs to hide after which element
the model is updated).
We assume that that samples from Fn,γPoisson can be drawn efficiently and describe how in
Appendix §B. The algorithm relies on two functions that have access to the samples: getsamplesize(i)
and getsamplepos(i, l) which return the size of the ith sample and the position of element l in ith
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Algorithm 2 Oblivious samplesPoisson(D, γ): takes an encrypted dataset D and returns Poisson
sample(s) with parameter γ, n = |D|
1: D ← oblshuffle(D)
2: Poisson.initialize(n, γ)
3: S ← []
4: j ← 1, l← 1, e← D[1], enext ← D[1]
5: k′ ← 1, cursize← Poisson.getsamplesize(1)
6: while cursize + Poisson.getsamplesize(k′ + 1) ≤ n and k′ + 1 ≤ k do
7: k′ ← k′ + 1
8: cursize← cursize + Poisson.getsamplesize(k′)
9: end while
10: while j ≤ cursize do
11: for i ∈ [1, k′] do
12: if Poisson.samplemember(i, l) then
13: pos←∑i′<i Poisson.getsamplesize(i′) + Poisson.getsamplepos(i, l)
14: S.append(re-enc(e), enc(i), enc(pos))
15: j ← j + 1
16: enext ← D[j]
17: end if
18: end for
19: e← enext
20: l← l + 1
21: end while
22: for j ∈ [cursize + 1, n] do
23: S.append(enc(dummy), enc(0), enc(j))
24: end for
25: S ← oblshuffle(S)
26: Decrypt pos (last part) of every tuple in S and use it to sort the encrypted elements
27: Return S
sample. The algorithm uses the former to compute k′ and creates replicas for samples with identifiers
from 1 to k′. The other changes to the Algorithm 1 are that S.append(enc(e), enc(i)) is substituted
with S.append(enc(e), enc(i), enc(pos)) where pos = ∑i′<i getsamplesize(i′) + getsamplepos(i, l). If
the total number of elements in the first k′ samples is less than n, the algorithm appends dummy
elements to S. S is then shuffled. After that positions pos can be decrypted and sorted (non-
obliviously) to bring elements from the same samples together. In a decrypted form this corresponds
to samples ordered one after another sequentially, following with dummy elements if applicable.
5 Experimental results
The goal of our evaluation is to understand the impact of sampling on the accuracy of training
of neural network models and their differentially private variants, We show that accuracy of all
sampling mechanisms is the same while shuffling has the highest privacy loss.
We use TensorFlow v1.13 and TensorFlow Privacy library [5] for DP training. We implement
non-oblivious SWO and Poisson sampling mechanisms since accuracy of the training procedure is
independent of sampling implementation. We report an average of 5 runs for each experiment.
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Table 2: Test (Train) accuracy of MNIST & CIFAR10 models trained with samples generated with
Shuffle, Poisson and sampling w/o replacement (SWO) and their differentially private (DP) variants
with incurred total .
Shuffle Poisson SWO
MNIST 97.5 (98.33) 97.47 (98.31) 97.43 (98.31)
DP MNIST 94.06 (94.1) 94.1 (94.01) 94.03 (94.05)
 9.39 0.82 2.13
Shuffle SWO
CIFAR-10 79.6 (83.2) 79 (82.9)
DP CIFAR-10 73.4 (72.3) 72.5 (71)
 9.39 4.89
Our implementation relies on DP optimizer from [5] which builds on ideas from [3] to implement
noisySGD as described in §3. Note that this procedure is independent of the sampling mechanism
behind how the batch is obtained. The only exception is Poisson where the average is computed
using a fixed sample size (γ × n) vs. its real size as for the other two sampling mechanisms. We
set the clipping parameter to 4, σ = 6, δ = 10−5. For each sampling mechanism we use a different
privacy accountant to compute exact total  as opposed to asymptotical guarantees in Table 1.
For shuffling we use [43, 24]; for Poisson sampling [5]; and for SWO we implement the approach
from [40].
MNIST dataset contains 60,000 train and 20,000 test images of ten digits with the classification
tasks of determining which digit an image corresponds to. We use the same model architecture as [3]
and [43]. It is a feed-forward neural network comprising of a single hidden layer with 1000 ReLU
units and the output layer is softmax of 10 classes corresponding to the 10 digits. The loss function
computes cross-entropy loss. During training we sample data using shuffling, sampling without
replacement and Poisson. For the first two we use batch size m = 600, γ = 0.01 and m = 200,
γ = 0.003 in Figure 1. Each network is trained for 100 epochs. We report the results in Table 2
(left). We observe that sampling mechanism does not change accuracy for this benchmark.
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Figure 1: Accuracy and  for MNIST
over epochs for sample sizes 200 and
600.
CIFAR-10 dataset consists of 50,000 training and
10,000 test color images classified into 10 classes [1]. Each
example is a 32 × 32 image with three channels (RGB).
We use the training setup from the TensorFlow tutorial [2]
for CIFAR-10 including the data augmentation step. The
same setup was also used in [3]. The network consists of
two convolutional layers followed by two fully connected
layers. Similar to [3, 43] we use a public dataset (CIFAR-
100) to train a network with the same architecture. We
then use the pre-trained network to train the fully con-
nected layers using the CIFAR-10 dataset. Each network
is trained for 100 epochs with sample size of m = 2000.
We use the same network setup as related work [3]; but
better accuracy can be achieved with deeper networks.
The results for shuffling and sampling w/o replacement
are in Table 2 (right). Similar to MNIST there is no
significant difference between the two.
Sampling in differentially private training In Ta-
ble 2 (middle row) we compare the effect of sampling
approaches on DP training. Similar to results reported in
previous work DP training degrades model performance.
However, accuracy between sampling approaches is similar.
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The difference between the sampling mechanism is evident however in the total privacy loss they
occur. The results in last row of Table 2 show that shuffling incurs the highest privacy loss for the
same number of epochs, in line with asymptotical guarantees in Table 1. In Figure 1 we show that
as expected smaller sample (batch) size has a positive effect on  for sampling.
These results indicate that if maintaining low privacy loss is important then SWO and Poisson
should be the preferred option for obtaining batches: sampling gives smaller privacy loss and same
accuracy.
6 Related work
The use of TEEs for privacy-preserving data analysis has been considered in several prior works.
Multi-party machine learning using Intel SGX and data-oblivious machine learning algorithms has
been described in [29]. Prochlo [9] shuffles user records using TEEs for anonymization. Secret
shuffle allows Prochlo to obtain strong guarantees from local DP algorithms [45] that are applied
to records before the shuffle. Systems in [44, 27] consider map-reduce-like computation for data
analysis while hiding access pattern between computations. Slalom [38] proposes a way to partially
outsource inference to GPUs from TEEs while maintaining integrity and privacy.
Oblivious algorithms as software protection were first proposed in [15, 16]. Recently, relaxation
of security guarantees for hiding memory accesses have been considered in the context of differential
privacy. Allen et al. [4] propose an oblivious differentially-private framework for designing DP
algorithms that operate over data that does not fit into private memory of a TEE (as opposed
to sample-based analysis). Chan et al. [12] have considered implications of relaxing the security
guarantees of hiding memory accesses from data-oblivious definition to the differentially-private
variant. Neither of these works looked at the problem of sampling. In a concurrent and independent
work, Shi [34] has developed a data-oblivious sampling algorithm for generating one random sample
from a stream of elements. In comparison, we consider the setting where k samples need to be
generated from a dataset of n elements, thereby amortising the cost of processing the dataset across
multiple samples.
We refer the reader to [13] for more information on differential privacy. Besides work mentioned
in §3, we highlight several other works on the use of sampling for differential privacy. Sample-
Aggregate [26] is a framework based on sampling where k random samples are taken such that in
total all samples have ≈ n elements, a function is evaluated on each sample, and k outputs are then
aggregated and reported with noise. Kasiviswanathan et al. [21] study concept classes that can
be learnt in differentially private manner based on a sample size and number of interactions. DP
natural language models in [23] are trained using a method of [3] while using data of a single user as
a mini-batch. Amplification by sampling has been studied for Re´nyi differential private mechanisms
in [40]. Finally, PINQ [24], assuming a trusted curator setting, describes a system for answering
database queries with DP guarantees.
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A Details of Oblivious SWO Sampling (§4.1)
Sampling primitive A single sample of SWO from domain [1, n] can be instantiated using a
permutation ρ over [1, n]. The sample is defined by elements that are mapped to the first m
elements, i.e., element j is in the sample if ρ(j) ≤ m. This procedure is described in Algorithm 3 for
k samples. During the initialize call, random permutations are chosen (e.g., in the real implementation
this would correspond to choosing a random seed and then deriving k seeds for each permutation).
Then, samplemember(i, j) returns True or False depending on whether j is in the ith sample or not.
Observe that each sample defined by the above primitive represents a valid SWO sample. Let
si be the sample that consists of the first m elements of the permutation ρi. The probability of
choosing a particular sample is the probability of choosing one of the permutations where the
first m elements are fixed. Since there are (n−m)! permutations with first m elements fixed: the
probability of si is (n−m)!/n! and is 1n 1n−1 · · · 1n−m+1 which is the probability of an SWO sample.
Algorithm 3 Instantiation of SWO sampling for k = n/m samples drawn from Fn,mSWO
initialize(n,m): choose random permutations with domain [1, n]: ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk
samplemember(i, j): If ρi(j) ≤ m return True, else False
Security of Algorithm 1 The adversary observes an oblivious shuffle, a scan where an element
is read and an encrypted pair is written, another oblivious shuffle and then a scan that reveals
the sample identifiers. Since oblivious shuffle is independent of the content of D and the shuffle
permutation, all patterns except for revealing of the sample identifiers are independent of the data.
We are left to argue that revealing sample ids and their locations (i.e., indices in the output S) does
not reveal information about the data nor the samples. First note that there are m copies of sample
ids 1, 2, . . . , k associated with a ciphertext, hence data-independent. Second, note that locations of
the revealed identifiers are random according to the permutation chosen in the second shuffle step.
Since the permutation of the shuffles are hidden, the adversary does not learn the location of the
tuple before and after the shuffle.
Lemma 1. Let pi be a permutation over n elements, ∀j ∈ [1, n], rj ∈ [0, k] such that
∑n rj = n and
K = {j | rj ≥ 1}. For l ∈ [1, n], let m(l) = pi−1(1 +
∑l−1
j=1 rj). Then m evaluated on keys in K is an
injective random function over [1, n].
Proof. The statement follows from two observations: pi−1 is a permutation and pi−1 is evaluated
only on distinct elements from a set [1, n].
The second observation is true since the mapping from l to 1 +
∑l−1
j=1 rj , when evaluated on
l ∈ [1, n], is injective as it is strictly monotonic. Moreover, (1 +∑l−1j=1 rj) ≤ n since ∑n rj = n.
Co-domain of m appears independent of its input since it is a subset of the output of a random
permutation function pi that has these properties by definition.
B Details of Oblivious Poisson Sampling (§4.2)
Sampling primitive Instantiation of Poisson samples (Algorithm 4) is an extension of SWO
sampling that in addition also randomly chooses the size for each sample, Mi. Recall that for SWO
the sample size is fixed (m) while Poisson sampling takes γ as a parameter and adds an element to
the sample with probability γ. Since the size of a Poisson sample is a random variable Binom(n, γ),
for each sample we draw a random variable from this Binomial distribution and use it to determine
the sample size.
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Observe that each sample defined by the above primitive represents a valid Poisson sample.
Let si be the sample that consists of the first Mi elements of the permutation ρi. The probability
of choosing si is the probability of the Binomial random variable being Mi and then choosing a
permutation where the first Mi elements are fixed. The probability of the former is
(
n
Mi
)
γMi(1− γ)Mi .
Then the probability of si is
(
n
Mi
)
γMi(1−γ)Mi(n−Mi)!/n! = γMi(1−γ)Mi/Mi! and is γMi(1−γ)Mi
if the element order within the sample is not relevant. Hence, samples produced by Algorithm 4 are
distributed as Poisson samples of the corresponding sizes.
Algorithm 4 Instantiation of Poisson sampling for k = nγ samples drawn from Fn,γPoisson
initialize(n, γ):
choose random permutations with domain [1, n]: ρ1, ρ2, . . . , ρk
∀i ∈ [1, k], Mi ← Binom(n, γ)
samplemember(i, j): If ρi(j) ≤Mi return True, else False
getsamplesize(i): return Mi
getsamplepos(i, l): return ρi(l)
Analysis Performance of oblivious Poisson sampling is dominated by two oblivious shuffles and
the non-oblivious sorting in Line 26 since the replication scan is linear.
Security of Algorithm 2 follows that of SWO except it requires k′ to be hidden from an adversary.
In particular, the adversary observes two shuffles and a scan where one element is read and one
written out (hence, data-independent). The content of the elements written out is encrypted or
re-encrypted to hide which elements read from external memory are written out. The total size of
all the samples (cursize) is protected by padding the output to n. Hence, the adversary observes
only positions of every tuple (Line 26). However, by construction position values are 1 to n and are
randomly shuffled, hence, they are independent of the actual samples. The sample boundary, which
can be determined from the middle part of the tuples, enc(i), in S, is encrypted and not revealed to
the adversary. Note that tuples with enc(0) denote padded dummy elements and do not belong to
any sample.
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